The Cost of Ambiguity and Robustness in International Pollution Control by Anastasios Xepapadeas
The Cost of Ambiguity and Robustness in
International Pollution Control
Anastasios Xepapadeas1
Athens University of Economics and Business and Beijer Fellow
xepapad@aueb.gr
January 8, 2011
1I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Stergios Athanassoglou and
the participants of the ￿ Climate Change and Common Sense￿workshop in Honour
of Tom Schelling, Manchester 20-22 October 2010, for valuable comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.Abstract
This paper examines robustness in international pollution control emerg-
ing from the regulator￿ s concerns regarding possible misspeci￿cation of the
natural system that is used to model pollution dynamics. Cooperative and
noncooperative robust policy rules are determined along with the cost in
terms of value loss of being robust relative to conventional policy rules.
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International pollution control is an issue that has acquired great signi￿cance
during recent decades, both in terms of academic research and in terms of
applied policy making. As Barrett (2005, p. 1459) points out, ￿It is a cliche
to say that nature obeys no borders - but it is also true.￿Thus many major
environmental problems entail situations in which activities in one country
create negative externalities not only in the country itself but also in other
countries. Such problems include the pollution of rivers and lakes that border
more than one country - a transboundary pollution problem - and regional
or global environmental problems, such as acid rains, ozone depletion and
climate change.
From the point of view of resource allocation, problems associated with
global pollution, such as climate change, belong to the theory of the voluntary
provision of public goods, or more precisely ￿ public bads￿ , since global pollu-
tion satis￿es the basic characteristics of a public good, namely nonrivalry in
consumption and nonexcludability.
The general methodological approach in dealing with these problems is
to: (i) determine a noncooperative solution through which countries choose
their emission levels by optimizing individual objectives without taking into
account the external costs imposed on other countries, (ii) determine a coop-
erative solution through which countries determine their emissions by opti-
mizing a global objective so that a Pareto e¢ cient outcome is obtained, and
(iii) compare the cooperative and noncooperative solutions. In this way one
can explore the ine¢ ciency of the noncooperative equilibrium and propose a
course of action that can achieve the e¢ cient outcome, which is the global
pollution level that maximizes global welfare.
International pollution problems are very often analyzed in a dynamic
setup, since the pollutants associated with these problems are of a stock
or fund type and environmental damages are associated with the stock of
the accumulated pollutant in the ambient environment. When cooperative
solutions are analyzed, standard optimal control techniques which are applied
to environmental and resource economics are used (e.g. Xepapadeas, 1997,
1chapter 2). When con￿ ict and strategic interactions among countries make
necessary the analysis of noncooperative solutions, then the di⁄erential games
framework has been extensively used.1
Uncertainty is another issue that has been addressed extensively in these
problems. Apart from a general kind of uncertainty associated with the future
costs and bene￿ts of an action, there is the speci￿c uncertainty associated
with the evolution of the natural system. This uncertainty could arise from
sources such as major gaps in knowledge, limited modelling capacity and
lack of theories to anticipate thresholds, and emergence of surprises and un-
expected consequences. These uncertainties may impede adequate scienti￿c
understanding of the underlying natural system mechanisms and the impacts
of policies applied to these systems. The discussion about the uncertainty
surrounding climate sensitivity and the implications of fat tailed distribu-
tions in climate policies has highlighted the types of uncertainty surrounding
the evolution of natural systems (e.g. Stern, 2007; Weitzman, 2009). For the
purposes of our analysis we will refer to the overall uncertainty associated
with these sources as scienti￿c uncertainty.
One feature of the above structure of uncertainty is that it might be
di¢ cult or even impossible to associate probabilities with uncertain shocks
a⁄ecting the natural system evolution. This is close to the concept of uncer-
tainty as introduced by Frank Knight (1921) to represent a situation where
there is ignorance, or not enough information to assign probabilities to events.
Knight argued that uncertainty in this sense of unmeasurable uncertainty is
more common in economic decision making. It seems that this type of uncer-
tainty might also be relevant for modeling the evolution of natural systems.
Knightian uncertainty is contrasted to risk (measurable or probabilistic
uncertainty) where probabilities can be assigned to events and are summa-
rized by a subjective probability measure or a single Bayesian prior. The
concept of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity has been associated formally
with a concept of multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), as well as
with a concept of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion, which in general in-
1For a recent survey of the use of dynamic games in economics and pollution control,
see Jorgensen et al. (2010).
2creases with an ignorance parameter (Chen and Epstein, 2002).
In economics, decision making under risk is typically modelled as expected
utility maximization. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), motivated by the Els-
berg (1961) paradox, provided an axiomatic foundation of Wald￿ s (1950)
maxmin criterion, and showed that a maxmin expected utility theory based
on the least favorable prior (LFP) can be used under conditions of Knightian
uncertainty.2
Ambiguity aversion and decisions based on maxmin criteria and LFPs can
be associated with the concept of the precautionary principle (PP), which
is an approach wherein actions are taken to anticipate and avert serious or
irreversible harm, such as for example the prevention of severe damages or an
irreversible catastrophic event associated with climate change, in advance of
or without a clear demonstration that such action is necessary. As Marchant
(2003, p. 1799) states, "By formalizing and bringing precaution to the fore-
front, the precautionary principle has the potential to make environmental
decision making more deliberative, transparent, and coherent."
The idea of an LFP, or a worst-case scenario, and serious or possibly
irreversible changes can be intuitively put together, since the emergence of
an LFP could lead to serious damages or an irreversible change. Therefore a
direct link can be made between LFP ideas and the PP. Scienti￿c uncertainty
or model uncertainty underlying the natural systems can be manifested in
multiple priors. The decision maker cannot choose among them but one or
more of these priors, the LFP, could lead to severe damages or irreversible
change. To prevent these damages, which are not clearly demonstrated since
the decision maker does not know that the LFP will prevail, precaution might
be desirable in designing speci￿c policy rules, which implies that the decision
rule could be based on the LFP. Thus, the maxmin expected utility could
be used as a conceptual framework for designing management rules which
adhere to a precautionary behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of introducing
2Given a set of prior probability distributions associated with the multiple priors frame-
work, the LFP is the one that corresponds to the least favorable outcomes. It can be
associated with the concept of the worst-case scenario. Under Knightian uncertainty the
researcher cannot choose one prior to de￿ne expected utility as is done under risk.
3ambiguity associated with uncertainty in the evolution of natural systems
and precautionary concerns based on preferences for robustness under sci-
enti￿c uncertainty, in a stylized international pollution control problem. By
comparing solutions under risk and under ambiguity, we provide a measure of
the impact of adopting robust approaches in international control along with
an approach to determine the extra cost of being robust and precautionary.
2 Modeling ambiguity
The type of uncertainty described above can be modeled by associating it
with the case of a decision maker who is trying to make good choices when he
regards his model not as the correct one, but as an approximation of the cor-
rect one or, to put it di⁄erently, when the decision maker has concerns about
possible misspeci￿cations of the correct model and wants to incorporate these
concerns into the decision-making rules (e.g., Salmon, 2002; Hansen and Sar-
gent, 2001a,b; 2008; Hansen et al., 2006; JET, 2006). The misspeci￿cation
concerns emerge because the regulator cannot assign probabilities to events
or, to put it in the Gilboa and Schmeidler context, the regulator is faced with
multiple priors.
Having concerns about model misspeci￿cation, following Hansen et al.
(2006) or Hansen and Sargent (2008), means that the regulator distrusts
his model and wants good decisions over a cloud of models that surrounds
the regulator￿ s benchmark model. The models in the cloud are di¢ cult to
distinguish with ￿nite data sets.
The cloud of models or the set of approximate models is obtained by
disturbing a benchmark model by introducing a misspeci￿cation error, so that
the admissible disturbances re￿ ect the set of possible probability measures
that the decision maker is willing to consider, or alternatively how ambiguous
the decision maker is about the benchmark model. The more ambiguous the
regulator is, the larger is the cloud of approximate models that he is willing
to consider. In this setup the good or robust decisions are obtained by
introducing a ￿ctitious ￿ adversarial agent￿which we will refer to as Nature.
Nature promotes robust decision rules by forcing the regulator, who seeks to
4maximize an objective, to explore the fragility of decision rules to departures
from the benchmark model. A robust decision rule to model misspeci￿cation
means that lower bounds to the rule￿ s performance are determined by Nature,
the adversarial agent who acts as a minimizing agent when constructing these
lower bounds. Hansen et al. (2006) show that robust control theory can be
interpreted as a recursive version of maxmin expected utility theory (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989). In this context the decision maker cannot or does not
formulate a single probability model and maximizes expected utility assuming
the probability weights are chosen by Nature.
In this paper ambiguity is modeled in terms of a robust control problem.
As will become clear later, the standard expected utility maximizing model
could be derived as a special case of the robust control model when the
regulator has no concerns about model misspeci￿cation and completely trusts
the benchmark model. By comparing the decision rules between the two cases
￿mistrust versus complete trust in the benchmark model ￿it is possible to
compare the impact of ambiguity and robustness on decision rules derived
from international pollution control models as well as the cost implied by
concerns about model misspeci￿cation and the desire to be precautionary
when designing regulation.3
3 International pollution control under model
misspeci￿cation
The cooperative and the noncooperative setup of international pollution con-
trol is modeled in the standard way (e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992)
or Dockner and van Long (1993)). To make the model simple, so that it is
easier to trace the impact of ambiguity and precaution, the two-country lin-
ear quadratic speci￿cation of Dockner and van Long is adopted. Thus there
are two countries indexed by i = 1;2: Output in each country is a function
of emissions Qi = Fi (Ei); where Fi (￿) is strictly concave with Fi (0) = 0:
3For a similar approach to resource management, see for example Roseta-Palma and
Xepapadeas (2004) and Vardas and Xepapadeas (2010).
5Emissions contribute to the stock of a global pollutant P (t): The evolution
of the pollution stock is described by the usual linear di⁄erential equation,4
_ P = E1 + E2 ￿ mP ;P (0) = P0; (1)
where m > 0 re￿ ects the environment￿ s self cleaning capacity and t is dropped
to ease notation. Utility in each country, assuming constant population nor-
malized to one, is ui (Fi (Ei))￿C (P) with C (P) being the cost of the global
pollutant where
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subject to pollution dynamics, where e￿￿t is the appropriate discount fac-
tor.. Uncertainty is introduced in the standard way, so that the stock of the
pollutant accumulates according to the stochastic di⁄erential equation
dP = (E1 + E2 ￿ mP)dt + ￿d^ z; P (0) = P0 ￿xed (5)
where f^ z(t) : t ￿ 0g is a Brownian motion on an underlying probability space
f￿;F;Gg. In the terminology of the previous section, this is the benchmark
model.5
Following Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b; 2008), concerns about model
misspeci￿cation are introduced by a family of stochastic perturbations of the
Brownian motion, so that the probabilities implied by (5) are distorted by
replacing the measure G by a measure Q: The main idea is that stochastic
4To keep things simple nonlinearities and nonconvexities in the dynamics are not con-
sidered. For their implication, see for example Kossioris et al. (2008).
5It should be noted that for any ￿xed (E1;E2) > (0;0); (5) is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process with long-term mean E1 + E2 and long-term variance ￿2=2:
6processes under Q will be di¢ cult to distinguish from those under G using
￿nite data. The perturbed model is obtained by replacing ^ z(t) with:




where fz(t) : t ￿ 0g is a Brownian motion and fv(t) : t ￿ 0g is a mea-
surable drift distortion which can be interpreted as a misspeci￿cation error
of the pollution dynamics which is expressed in terms of deviations from
the benchmark case. The benchmark case is de￿ned for v (t) := 0. The












R(Q) ￿ ￿; (8)
the decision maker can restrict the size of the relative entropy and establish
the set of distributions that will be considered. By choosing ￿; the decision
maker can determine the ￿ size￿of the cloud of approximate models that will be
considered given a benchmark model, which in a sense could determine how
much misspeci￿cation is justi￿ed given the existing knowledge and history
of the natural system. Considering a least favorable prior which would cor-
respond to a large ￿ does not need to imply a catastrophic event, but rather
re￿ ects the ￿ maximum￿misspeci￿cation that the regulator wants to embody
into the decision rule, given the existing data and history of the phenomenon
under consideration. Pollution dynamics under model misspeci￿cation can
be written, by replacing d^ z with dz; as:
dP = (E1 + E2 ￿ mP + ￿v)dt + ￿dz; P (0) = P0 ￿xed. (9)
When the regulator has no concerns about model misspeci￿cation, that is
7v = 0; then we are in the case of decision making under risk where expected
utility theory is appropriate. When the regulator has concerns about model
misspeci￿cation, that is v 6= 0; then we are in the case of decision making
under ambiguity or uncertainty where maxmin expected utility theory is
appropriate. Two robust control problems have been associated with the
problem of maximizing (4) subject to (9) (Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b;
2006; 2008): the constrained robust control problem





















subject to (9) and (8)
and the multiplier robust control problem


























In both problems, the minimizing agent, Nature, chooses v: In the mul-
tiplier problem, ￿ 2 (￿;+1]; ￿ > 0 is a penalty parameter restraining the
minimizing choice of the v (t) function. The lower bound ￿ is a so-called
breakdown point beyond which it is fruitless to seek more robustness be-
cause the minimizing agent is su¢ ciently unconstrained so that he can push
the criterion function to ￿1 despite the best response of the maximizing
agent. Thus when ￿ < ￿; robust control rules cannot be attained. On the
other hand when ￿ ! 1; then there are no concerns about model misspec-
i￿cation. As shown by Hansen and Sargent (2006), under certain regularity
assumptions the penalty parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the Lagrangian
multiplier of the constrained robust control problem. Thus there is a direct
link between ￿ and the size of entropy the the regulator is willing to incorpo-
rate into the policy rule. Although the constrained robust control problem is
more intuitive, the approach that has been followed in general is the solution
of the more tractable multiplier robust control problem.
It should be noted that a non-negativity (or irreversibility) constraint on
emissions Ei ￿ 0 is not imposed in the robust control problems (10) or (11),
8which implies that clean up is possible. There are of course many cases in
pollution control where a more realistic assumption would be to impose the
non-negativity constraint. If under emissions non-negativity there are models
where a certain emission pro￿le may cause irreversible damages, low emis-
sions have a positive option value, since if the LFP that causes the irreversible
damage is realized, the regulator is not irrevocably committed to a high stock
of the pollutant implying unavoidable costs. Thus the irreversibility is a con-
sequence of the policy maker￿ s inability to reduce the stock of pollution which
is captured by the non-negativity constraint, Ei ￿ 0: Without the nonegativ-
ity constraint low emissions have no option value since clean up is possible.6
In this paper emission irreversibility is not considered, which would have re-
quired the use of a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, or as is more common in these
problems, a real options approach, where the ￿ stopping￿domain Ei = 0 and
the interior domain Ei > 0 are joined by value matching and smooth pasting
conditions.7 The relation between emission irreversibility and ambiguity is
beyond the purpose of the present paper and could be an interesting area for
future research. Since, however, irreversibility of emissions and damages, a
case which is closer to the concept of the PP, is not explicitly considered, the
policies described in this paper will be referred to as robust policies rather
than as policies associated with a PP.
In this robust control framework, the following sections analyze the coop-
erative and noncooperative solutions of the international pollution problem
under risk and under ambiguity.
4 The cooperative solution under risk
The cooperative solution is obtained by maximizing expected joint welfare de-
￿ned by (4). Given the linear quadratic structure of the problem, a quadratic
6I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
7See for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the general approach of real options and
Xepapadeas (1998), Wirl (2008) for application to environmental policy issues.
9value function




2 ￿ ￿P ￿ ￿ (12)
with ￿rst and second derivatives
DW = ￿￿P ￿ ￿ ;D
2W = ￿￿ (13)
is considered. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for this prob-
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The parameters of the value function are obtained as usual by equating
coe¢ cients of the same power. In this case the optimal cooperative emissions
in a feedback form will be
E
￿ = (A ￿ ￿) ￿ aP: (17)
Substituting optimal cooperative emissions from (17) into (5), the evolution
of the pollutant stock under the cooperative solutions will be determined by
10the solution of the stochastic di⁄erential equation
dP = [2(A ￿ ￿) ￿ (2￿ + m)P]dt + ￿dz: (18)
This an Ornstein-Uhlembeck process with solution














The mean and variance corresponding to the cooperative solution are













with long-run expected value EP ￿ = ￿ =
2(A￿￿)
(2￿+m); varP ￿ = ￿2
2r0 = ￿2
2(2￿+m). It
is obvious that if ￿ > 0 this steady state will be stable.
To make the solution clear and to make possible comparisons with the
noncooperative and the ambiguity cases, we use a numerical example where
￿ = 0:05;￿ = 1;A = 100;m = 0:03;s = 1: (23)
Then ￿ = 0:972878, ￿ = 96:0509, E￿ (t) = 3:94914 ￿ 0:972878P (t); and
EP ￿ = 3:9976:
Figure 1 below presents the time path for EP ￿ (t) (thick line) along with
a belt of ￿3
p
varP ￿ (t) (dashed lines) from an initial stock accumulation
P0 = 2:
11Figure 1: EP ￿ (t) ￿ 3
p
varP ￿ (t)
5 Robust control and the cooperative solu-
tion under ambiguity
When concerns about misspeci￿cation of the pollution dynamics exist, then
the cooperative solution can be obtained as the solution of the following





























subject to (9). (25)
The benchmark optimal control problem is a special case of (24) for v (t) ￿
0; and corresponds to the cooperative solution under risk. Using again a
quadratic value function W 0 (P) = ￿1
2￿0P 2￿￿
0P ￿￿0; the Isaacs condition













































2 = A ￿ ￿
0 ￿ ￿
0P: (28)
It is clear that if ￿ ! 1; then v ! 0 and we are back to the benchmark


























































and the parameters of the value function are obtained as before by equating
coe¢ cients of the same power. Substituting the optimal choice of the ad-
versarial agent (27) and optimal robust cooperative emissions (28) into (9),
the evolution of the pollutant stock under the cooperative solution will be
























dt + ￿dz (30)
13with mean and variance












































Thus our results are a function of the penalty parameter ￿: Provided that
￿0 and ￿
0 converge to ￿nite values as ￿ ! 1; and this has been veri￿ed
for all numerical simulations, then the limit of EP (t;￿) and varP (t;￿) as
￿ ! 1 converge to their benchmark value, indicating that the model with
no misspeci￿cation concerns can be regarded as a special case of the robust
control model when ￿ ! 1: Thus when ￿ becomes large, the results regarding
the parameters of the value function, the optimal emissions and the expected
steady state pollution accumulation should converge to the results obtained
for the benchmark model. Figure 2 presents ￿0 as a function of ￿:
Figure 2: ￿0 vs ￿
The parameter remains positive so the stability requirement is satis￿ed
and as ￿ increases it tends to the benchmark case value of ￿ = 0:972878:
Figure 3 presents the value function for three values of the penalty para-
meter ￿ = f50;100;500g:
14Figure 3: The value function
The value function shifts downward as ￿ decreases (the top line corresponds to
￿ = 500 while the bottom to ￿ = 50) indicating that as concerns about model
misspeci￿cation increase, the robust control of the system becomes more
costly as the system loses value. Table 1 shows the values of the value function
at di⁄erent levels of ￿ with P set at the initial value P0 = 2 . Therefore robust
control under concerns about model misspeci￿cation becomes more costly. As
misspeci￿cation concerns increase, the changes in the value function, as ￿ is
reduced, can be interpreted as the cost of robustness or the cost of being more
precautionary in order to avoid potentially severe damages associated with
the emergence of an LFP from the cloud of models that satisfy the entropy
constraint.
Table 1: The cost of robustness under cooperation





15Figure 4 presents optimal robust emissions in feedback form for di⁄erent
values if ￿ = f50;100;500g: As concerns about misspeci￿cation increase,
optimal robust cooperative emissions are reduced and the emission function
shifts downwards as shown in ￿gure 4, where the top line corresponds to
￿ = 500 and the bottom line to ￿ = 50:
Figure 4: Optimal robust emissions
Finally ￿gure 5 presents the time path of expected robust cooperative
pollution accumulation for ￿ = f50;100;500g: As misspeci￿cation concerns
increase, that is ￿ is reduced, the steady state robust pollution accumulation
is reduced. This is in line with the behavior of the emissions function. An
increase in misspeci￿cation concerns (decrease of ￿); because the regulator
increases the size of entropy to be incorporated into the decision rule, will
reduce the robust emission policy function and will lead to reduced expected
pollution accumulation. This is indicated by a shift of the EP 0 (t) path down-
wards in ￿gure 5, where the top line corresponds to ￿ = 500 and the bottom
line to ￿ = 50: As ￿ increases, ambiguity goes down and misspeci￿cation con-
cerns decrease, robust emissions increase and as a result steady state stock
increases too and eventually converges to the benchmark value.
16Figure 5: Robust cooperative pollution accumulation
Finally ￿gure 6 below presents the time path for EP 0 (t) ￿ 3
p
varP ￿ (t)
from the initial stock accumulation P0 = 2 for ￿ = 50:
17Figure 6: EP 0 (t) ￿ 3
p
varP ￿ (t) ; ￿ = 50
Note that the expected steady state pollution accumulation for ￿ = 50 is
3.959, for ￿ = 1 is 2.701, while the expected accumulation at the benchmark
model (￿ ! 1) is 3.9976.
6 The noncooperative solution under risk
To study the noncooperative solution where each country maximizes expected
individual welfare subject to pollution dynamics, we assume that each coun-
try follows linear time stationary feedback strategies (or closed-loop) strate-
gies (Basar and Olsder, 1982), which are decision rules which condition in-
dividual emissions on the current stock of the global pollutant in a linear
fashion,8 or Ei (t) = ￿0 + ￿1P (t): Feedback strategies are associated with
the concept of feedback Nash equilibrium which is a strongly time-consistent
noncooperative solution (Basar, 1989).
The feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) for the linear quadratic inter-
national pollution game result from solving the dynamic programming or
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in the value functions Wi. The func-
tions and parameters of our problem do not directly depend on time, so the
problem is stationary. Therefore the equilibrium strategies can be repre-
sented in a time-stationary feedback form, Ei (t) = ￿0+￿1P (t), i = 1;2, and
the value functions Wi depend only on the state x. Furthermore, since the
problem is symmetric, only symmetric equilibria are considered.
The value function for each country is




2 ￿ ￿iP ￿ ￿i (34)
8For the analysis of nonlinear strategies, see Dockner and van Long (1993), Rubio and
Casino (2002), and Kossioris et al. (2008).























Ei = A ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿iP = E1 = E2; (36)
so individual country strategies are in a feedback or closed loop form. Drop-
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To compare cooperative and noncooperative solutions under risk, we con-
tinue our numerical example. The feedback equilibrium strategy is de￿ned
as Ei (t) = 36:3672 ￿ 0:55931P (t);i = 1;2; ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:55931; while the
expected FBNE pollution steady state is EPFBNE = 63:3235: The com-
parison of the cooperative equilibrium with the FBNE con￿rms the well
known result that the FBNE results in higher emissions and higher steady-
state pollution accumulation than the cooperative equilibrium. The FBNE
is stochastically stable since ￿i > 0: Figure 7 presents the time path for
EPFBNE (t) ￿ 3
p
varPFBNE (t) from an initial stock accumulation P0 = 2:
The comparison of ￿gure 7 with ￿gure 1 clearly shows the di⁄erences be-
tween the cooperative and the feedback Nash equilibrium in terms of the
equilibrium path of the state variable.
19Figure 7: EPFBNE (t) ￿ 3
p
varPFBNE (t)
7 Robust control and the noncooperative so-
lution under ambiguity





























dP = (E1 + E2 ￿ mP + ￿vi)dt + ￿Pdz; (40)
where vi is the misspeci￿cation error for country i when countries follow
time stationary linear feedback strategies. Assuming again a quadratic value
function W 0
i (P) = ￿1
2￿0
iP 2 ￿ ￿
0
iP ￿ ￿0
i; the Isaacs condition leads to the



































































































































The HJB equation (44) implies that the parameters of the value function
and the optimal feedback strategy for each country depend on the penalty
parameter ￿: Thus (44) can be used to determine a robust FBNE which is
the FBNE under conditions of ambiguity. As ￿ ! 1 the robust FBNE tends
to the FBNE under conditions of risk. The numerical example is used again
to obtain a clearer picture of the results.
Figure 8 presents ￿0
i as a function of ￿:
21Figure 8: a0
i vs ￿
The parameter remains positive so the stability requirement is satis￿ed, and
as ￿ increases it tends to the benchmark case value of ￿i = 0:55931:
Figure 9 presents the value function for two values of the penalty para-
meter ￿ = f10;500g:
Figure 9: The value function for FBNE
22The value function shifts downward as ￿ decreases (in ￿gure 9 the top
line corresponds to ￿ = 500 and the bottom line to ￿ = 10), indicating that
as concerns about model misspeci￿cation increase the robust control of the
system in each country becomes more costly as in the cooperative solution.
Table 2 shows the values of the value function at di⁄erent levels of ￿ with
P0 = 2. The changes in the value function as ￿ reduces can be interpreted as
the cost of each country being robust when no cooperation is taking place.







Figure 10 presents optimal noncooperative country emissions in feedback
form for di⁄erent values of ￿ = f10;500g: These are the feedback equilibrium
strategies parametrized by the parameter ￿. As in the cooperative case,
increased misspeci￿cation concerns reduce the noncooperative equilibrium
emissions.
23Figure 10: Optimal feedback emissions at the FBNE
Figure 11 presents the time path of the expected robust FBNE pollu-
tion accumulation for ￿ = f50;500g: As individual misspeci￿cation concerns
increase, that is ￿ is reduced, the expected steady-state robust pollution ac-
cumulation is reduced. This is indicated by a shift of the EP 0
FBNE (t) path
downwards in ￿gure 11, where the top line corresponds to ￿ = 500 and the
bottom line to ￿ = 50:
Figure 11: FBNE robust pollution accumulation
As ￿ increases, that is ambiguity is reduced, the steady-state stock increases
and eventually converges to the noncooperative benchmark value. Finally
￿gure 12 below presents the time path for EP 0




from the initial stock accumulation P0 = 2 for ￿ = 50:
24Figure 12: EP 0
FBNE (t) ￿ 3
p
varP 0
FBNE (t); ￿ = 50
8 Cooperation and the Cost of Robustness
Comparison of the results obtained from the numerical example, although not
conclusive, suggest that concerns about model misspeci￿cation formulated in
the context of robust control induce conservative behavior in the sense of re-
ducing emissions both at the cooperative and the noncooperative solution
relative to the pure risk case. Furthermore, reduced emissions under robust
control lead to lower expected steady-state pollution accumulation. Com-
parisons of the value functions for di⁄erent levels of the penalty parameter ￿
indicate that the more the regulator is concerned about model misspeci￿ca-
tion, the more costly is the design of robust control policies, that is, policies
which perform well even when the emerging model is not the benchmark
model. Increased concerns about model misspeci￿cation can be interpreted
as ￿ increased ambiguity￿regarding the laws governing the phenomenon, and
the desire to design good rules as ambiguity increases.
In our approach the level of ambiguity is related to the choice of ￿: Al-
25though this might be seen as arbitrary in the sense that ￿ is a free parameter,
the relation between the multiplier and the constraint control problems might
be used to discipline the choice of ￿: In particular, the solutions of all the
problems considered in this paper for a speci￿c ^ ￿ < 1 will determine the
relative entropy between the benchmark model and the distorted model that
corresponds to this ^ ￿: If prior knowledge about the natural phenomenon can
be used to specify ￿; that is to determine the misspeci￿cation or the size of
entropy that the regulator is willing to consider, the relation between the
chosen ^ ￿ and the speci￿ed ￿ can be established. The problem can be solved
for a set of ￿ until the relative entropy implied by a speci￿c ￿ is su¢ ciently
close to ￿: Alternatively, as suggested by Hansen and Sargent (2008) detec-
tion probabilities obtained from data of the past history of the phenomenon
can be used in more general setups to discipline the choice of ￿:
Allowing for misspeci￿cation concerns and preferences for robustness to
shape the policy rules introduces a contex-speci￿c precaution. Hansen and
Sargent (2001b) identify in this context precautionary savings, or boosting of
the price of risk. In our case this precaution can be identi￿ed with reduced
emissions in order to prevent damages which might arise if the benchmark
model is used for designing the policy, but due to misspeci￿cation, another
model, from the cloud of models which are considered, emerges. However
in this context more precaution is costly since the value of the system is
reduced under robust policies and increased ambiguity which is captured by
reductions in the ambiguity parameter ￿; or the increase of ￿.
Some insight about the relative costs of robustness between the cooper-
ative and the noncooperative solutions can be gained from ￿gure 13 which
depicts the loss in the value for the cooperative solution and the FBNE for
both countries as ￿ is reduced from 500 to 200 at steps of 10. The results
suggest that for the speci￿c numerical example, robustness seems to be more
costly under cooperation (solid line) relative to the FBNE. On the average
the loss at the cooperative solution is 13% higher relative to the FBNE.
26Figure 13: Cost of robusness, cooperative vs FBNE
9 Concluding remarks
This paper studies an approach for incorporating ambiguity and concerns
about model misspeci￿cation in a problem of international pollution control.
Since our knowledge regarding the dynamics underlying the accumulation
of transboundary or global pollutants has gaps ￿sometimes signi￿cant gaps
￿it seems that this type of approach is relevant for decision making. It
should be noted that in many pollution control problems, ambiguity could
be more profound in the cost implied by any level of stock and not in the
laws of motion for the stock itself, which implies that ambiguity could be
associated with the damage function. In the model presented in this paper,
the distinction of whether ambiguity arises in the processes governing the
pollutant cost or the pollutant stock does a⁄ect the qualitative results which
are derived from the presence of ambiguity in the relationship between future
27emissions and current welfare. Ambiguity that directly a⁄ects damages can
be introduced by writing the damage function as B (t)C (P) where B (t) is
a Brownian motion. Ambiguity in this context implies that B (t) should be
perturbed by measurable drift distortions. Although this approach increases
the complexity of the model since it introduces a second state variable it
might be an interesting area for further research.
The international pollution control problem was formulated in terms of
robust control decision rules which are decision rules that might perform
well for a set of models around a benchmark model which the decision maker
thinks might be misspeci￿ed. Since this approach is directly related to deci-
sion making when a worst-case scenario might emerge, these robust decision
rules can be associated with context-speci￿c precaution.
Using this framework the paper derives robust decision rules for cooper-
ative and noncooperative solutions regarding the emissions of two countries
which contribute to a global pollutant. It is shown that decision rules derived
when there is no concern about misspeci￿cation and the benchmark model
is trusted, are a special case of the robust control model where concerns are
parametrized by a penalty parameter. Using a simple linear quadratic model,
robust decisions rules for the cooperative and the feedback Nash equilibrium
with linear feedback strategies were derived.
A concern for precaution and the consequent adoption of a more precau-
tionary approach does, however, incur higher costs. The dynamic program-
ming approach followed here allowed the determination of the value function,
and the determination of the costs involved in terms of value loss from in-
creased concerns about misspeci￿cation and increased precaution. By com-
paring the robustness costs under cooperation and noncooperation, it might
be possible to study the structure of the incentives for precaution in the two
solutions. Better understanding of the structure of costs associated with pre-
caution and the relevant trade-o⁄s might be useful in the design of policies
to deal with global pollutants, since the deep uncertainties associated with
the evolution of these pollutants are what generate the precautionary needs.
An open issue in robust control is learning.9 In the robust control ap-
9Gollier et al. (2000), Asano (2010) have shown how the anticipation of future learning
28proach, learning is not explicitly incorporated into the modelling. One reason
(Hansen and Sargent 2008) is that because the regulator discounts the future,
the regulator cannot disregard current concerns about model misspeci￿cation
and wait for enough data to gather so that these concerns can be eliminated.
Hansen and Sargent suggest estimation and ￿ltering approaches that could
eliminate speci￿c misspeci￿cations concerns. Concerns that cannot be elim-
inated are incorporated into the lifetime entropy constraint (8). The more
misspeci￿cations concerns can be eliminated by learning at this stage, the
smaller is ￿, the larger is ￿ and the smaller the cost of robustness and concerns
for precaution. The question remains, however, of how to incorporate new
knowledge into the model when enough data have been gathered to justify a
revision of the entropy constraint constant ￿:
The analysis was kept at the linear quadratic level in order to make
clear certain key issues. Possible extensions could be symmetry breaking
so that the concerns about misspeci￿cation are di⁄erent among countries,
more extensive simulations in order to better trace relative precautionary
costs, and allowing for nonconvexities in pollution dynamics so that ￿ ips and
multiple basin of attractions are possible.
can a⁄ect the precautionary principle.
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